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VANITY AND VEXATION: SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO MEDIA
CONDUCT
Jane E. Kirtley*
Lawsuits brought by corporations against news organizations during the last
few years demonstrate that it is no longer sufficient for the press to get its facts
straight. With some industries literally fighting for their lives, a new legal climate
has encourage litigation that deflects bad publicity by shifting the focus away from
the traditional issue of accuracy to a critical examination of the news media's
newsgathering techniques. Concerns about the reaction of courts to unorthodox
reporting methods may prompt news organizations to censor themselves, but the
author argues that facing the threat of mega-verdicts or contempt citations should
be regarded as simply a cost of doing business.
"Yet vanity inclines us to find faults anywhere rather than in ourselves."
Samuel Johnson, The Idler No. 70
INTRODUCTION
In early November 1995, CBS Inc. decided not to air a 60 Minutes story
that would have featured an interview with a tobacco executive who criti-
cized the actions of his former employer, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation.' According to Don Hewitt, Executive Producer of 60 Minutes,
CBS lawyers were worried that the network would be sued for "something
called tortious interference."2
The problem with the interview, according to the lawyers, was not its
content, but the fact that the source had signed a confidentiality agreement
with his former employer, and nevertheless had agreed to talk about the
company with 60 Minutes reporters.' CBS lawyers' lack of confidence in
Executive Director, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
Arlington, Virginia; B.S.J. 1975, M.S.J. 1976, Northwestern University; J.D. 1979,
Vanderbilt University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Jeffrey A. Gauger, 1995-96 Legal Fellow at the Reporters Committee;
B.A. 1992, Indiana University; J.D. 1995, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
' Howard Kurtz, "60 Minutes" Kills Piece on Tobacco Industry, WASH. POST, Nov.
10, 1995, at A3.
2 Wade Lambert & Elizabeth Jensen, Companies Turn to Novel Tactics to Thwart
Negative News Stories, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at B8.
3 Kurtz, supra note 1, at A3.
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their ability to defend against a lawsuit based on a theory of tortious inter-
ference with contract shocked journalists both inside and outside the net-
work.4 The decision to spike the story, apparently in the absence of a direct
threat by the tobacco company, reflects a changing legal climate in which
news organizations must spar with large corporations that try to prevent or
deflect bad publicity by shifting the focus from their own conduct to the
media's newsgathering practices.
In some cases, companies may seek restraining orders to prevent the
dissemination of unflattering or embarrassing information. For the most part,
such efforts have been unsuccessful. For example, in Federal Beef Proces-
sors, Inc. v. CBS Inc.,5 a meat-packing company persuaded a South Dakota
state judge to order CBS not to broadcast on 48 Hours a videotape shot
inside its plant, alleging that the tape, depicting unsafe food handling prac-
tices, was obtained through deception and misdeeds. The order was over-
turned by Circuit Justice Harry A. Blackmun in time for the program to air
as originally scheduled. Justice Blackmun observed that "[s]ubsequent civil
or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appro-
priate sanction for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First
Amendment context."
6
Nevertheless, just a few weeks before CBS dropped its tobacco story, a
judge in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.7 ordered Business
Week, hours before it was going to press, not to publish information in the
magazine's possession that was subject to a stipulated confidentiality order
sealing pre-trial discovery documents in a civil case. Business Week failed to
persuade an appeals court panel, or Circuit Justice John Paul Stevens,' to
overturn the restraining order in time for it to publish its story on schedule.
Justice Stevens's refusal was prompted, at least in part, by a concern that
"the manner in which petitioner came into possession of the information it
seeks to publish may have a bearing on its right to do so."9
Despite the Sixth Circuit's subsequent repudiation of the Business Week
restraining orders, ° it is impossible to appraise the 60 Minutes incident
without considering Justice Stevens's ominous observation that the right to
See, e.g., James C. Goodale, "60 Minutes" v. CBS and Vice Versa, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 3.
, Civ. No. 94-590 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1994) (order granting temporary injunc-
tion), motion for stay denied sub nom. CBS Inc. v. Davis, No. 18637 (S.D. Feb. 8,
1994), stay granted, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994); see also Federal
Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 851 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (S.D. 1994).
6 CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
" 900 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Ohio 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
8 McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (Stevens, Circuit Jus-
tice 1995).
9 Id. at 7.
10 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
1070 [Vol. 4:3
VANITY AND VEXATION
publish can be affected by the methods used to gather the news. In an era in
which more and more news operations have turned to practices considered
by some to be unethical or even illegal, CBS's decision suggested that even
the most well-heeled media organizations are susceptible to a potent legal
threat: the increasingly successful tactic by plaintiffs of scrutinizing the
newsgathering techniques employed by the press. The assault on such media
practices challenges important First Amendment principles, including the
once nearly insurmountable presumption that prior restraints are unconstitu-
tional, in ways that were seemingly inconceivable just a few years ago.
Given the current legal climate, it is no longer sufficient for reporters to
concern themselves with simply getting the facts straight. They must also
consider how judges and juries will evaluate their methods of gathering
news.
This Article examines recent cases in which the traditional issues of
accuracy and truth were eclipsed by attacks on the newsgathering techniques
that produced indispensable information for each story. It suggests that the
precursors for this state of affairs lies in the seminal defamation case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, long regarded as the vehicle that revolu-
tionized investigative reporting and commentary in the United States.
In addition, this Article will consider the broader implications of the 60
Minutes incident, where CBS resorted to self-censorship of a truthful story
rather than risk having to defend itself against a potential claim of interfer-
ence with business relations based on how the story was obtained. In light
of the responses to these and other threats, it is worth asking whether a
media outlet today would risk contempt or other sanctions by publishing the
contemporary equivalent of the purloined Pentagon Papers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Pentagon Papers Case
In New York Times Co. v. United States,3 better known as the Penta-
gon Papers case, six Supreme Court Justices reaffirmed the heavy presump-
tion against prior restraints in a terse per curiam opinion issued just fifteen
days after a federal judge in Manhattan imposed a temporary restraining
order on publication of certain government documents by the New York
Times.' The Court overruled the Second Circuit's order prohibiting the
" See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
12 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
403 U.S. 713 (1971).United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded,
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New York Times from publishing classified documents leaked to it by Daniel
Ellsberg, a former Pentagon official.15 In six concurring opinions, the Jus-
tices considered what circumstances, if any, would justify a prior restraint
on the press.
First Amendment absolutists Justices Hugo L. Black and William 0.
Douglas clung to their position that the government could never enjoin pub-
lication by the press.16 Justice Black commended the Times for publishing
documents "revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam
War."'
7
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., hearkening back to dicta in the Supreme
Court's ruling in Near v. Minnesota,"8 argued that a prior restraint could be
upheld only if the government could prove that publication would "inevita-
bly, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea."' 9 Justice Potter Stewart
similarly contended that a prior restraint must be justified by a showing of
"direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."2
Justice Byron R. White opined that although publication of the Pentagon
Papers would "work serious damage to the country," the government could
not ban its publication, at least not in the absence of legislation by Con-
gress." The better course, Justice White wrote, would be to pursue a con-
viction in subsequent criminal proceedings: "That the Government mistaken-
ly chose to proceed by injunction does not mean that it could not proceed in
another way."22 Justice Thurgood Marshall's concurring opinion observed
that although it may be more convenient for the government to persuade a
judge to prohibit publication, "convenience ... do[es] not justify a basic
departure from the principles of our system of government" in the absence
of Congressional action.23
In dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices John Marshall
Harlan and Harry A. Blackmun decried the quick pace of the litigation.
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.) (en banc), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
" The documents were a classified, 47-volume Pentagon study entitled History of
U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT § 8.03(2) (1994); John C. Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Pa-
pers, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341 (1993).
16 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714-24 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
18 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
'9 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
' Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 732-33 (White, J., concurring).
I d. at 733 (White, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 742-43 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan listed seven difficult issues that required more time to re-
solve,' including whether the newspaper was entitled to retain documents
it knew to be stolen. 5
Chief Justice Burger emphasized this issue in his separate dissenting
opinion, focusing on the manner in which the Times had obtained and han-
dled the "purloined documents."'26 The Chief Justice expressed astonish-
ment that the Times had not simply returned the documents to the govern-
ment, stating:
To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper long re-
garded as a great institution in American life would fail to
perform one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen
with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property
or secret government documents. That duty, I had
thought-perhaps naively-was to report forthwith, to re-
sponsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers,
Justices, and the New York Times.27
B. Side Effects of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Before the Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of defamation in most states
simply by proving that a false publication had harmed her reputation.2
Sullivan and its progeny recognized that the First Amendment required a
departure from this sort of strict liability standard to discourage self-censor-
ship by the press.29 Sullivan forced public officials to prove that the pub-
lisher of libelous statements relating to official conduct acted with "actual
malice"-knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of whether a state-
ment was false? Three years later, the Supreme Court extended Sullivan's
"actual malice" standard to public figures.31
Id. at 754-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 748-52 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 751 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2 SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 11.01(1)(a) n.2.
29 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
30 Id. at 279-80.
31 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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1. Herbert v. Lando
In Herbert v. Lando,32 the Supreme Court ruled that because public
figures or officials must prove actual malice in order to prevail, they are
entitled to inquire into the newsgathering and editorial processes involved in
the stories at issue.33 This is not only time-consuming and expensive for
both sides,' but invites significant prying into activities that otherwise
would be protected from outside scrutiny.35
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had found that a
journalist's privilege was a logical safeguard necessary to ensure the right to
disseminate information. The panel opinion stated:
The acquisition of newsworthy material stands at the
other pole of the press's function. Freedom to cull informa-
tion is logically antecedent and necessary to any effective
exercise of the right to distribute news. Indeed, the latter
prerogative cannot be given full meaning unless the former
right is recognized.36
In rejecting that privilege, the Supreme Court noted that the libel plain-
tiff needed to "focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant" in
order to establish liability.37 The Court stated that a long, intrusive, and
32 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
11 Id. at 175.
14 As author Anthony Lewis recounts, the Herbert case went on for 12 years before
being dismissed. During that time, CBS producer and defendant Barry Lando was de-
posed 28 times and had to turn over all his files and videotapes of all interviews con-
ducted for the program. Plaintiff Anthony Herbert was compelled to turn over 12,000
pages of documents to CBS. The network spent in excess of $4 million in attorneys'
fees. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 202 (1991).
" As Randall Bezanson, law professor and proponent of a variety of libel "reform"
measures, has suggested,
Because of Sullivan, libel suits involve intrusions into the editorial process that
would be unthinkable in any other setting. Lawyers will be able to disgorge your
life history, present it to the world in its blemished grandeur, search your notes,
probe your mind, recreate your every judgment and doubt, and second-guess your
every action. They will be able to divert your attention, occupy countless hours of
your time, and threaten you with great personal and professional risk.
Randall Bezanson, Case Study: Sullivan Opened the Door to Troublesome Meddling
into How Journalists Do Their Jobs, NEWSINC., Apr. 1992, at 30.
36 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
37 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160.
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expensive discovery period was the price the media had to pay in exchange
for a higher burden of proof for libel plaintiffs.38 The opinion by Justice
Byron White observed: "If plaintiffs in consequence now resort to more dis-
covery, it would not be surprising; and it would follow that the costs and
other burdens of this kind of litigation would escalate and become much
more troublesome for both plaintiffs and defendants."39
2. Discovering Sources After Sullivan: Philip Morris Co. v. ABC/Capital
Cities, Inc.
In any libel suit against the media, the most disturbing area for pretrial
discovery involves plaintiffs' attempts to uncover the identity of reporters'
confidential sources. Herbert did not directly address whether confidential
sources would be subject to pretrial discovery. The Court's seminal decision
on the reporter's privilege, Branzburg v. Hayes," addressed compelled dis-
closure to a grand jury of confidential information pertaining to criminal
activity, but it did not discuss disclosure in the libel context. Accordingly,
journalists were forced to look to lower federal and state courts to determine
what, if any, protection they would have in libel cases. Twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have "shield" laws providing varying degrees
of protection from forced disclosure of sources.4' Most states also provide
some degree of privilege based on constitutional or common law.42
8 Id. at 176.
39 Id.
- 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
41 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.220-.360 (1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510
(Michie 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90-
119, 24-72.5-101 to .5-106 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1995); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 735, paras. 5/8-901 to -903 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE § 35-3-5-1 (Burns
1986 & Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1459 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-112 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021-.025 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to -903 (1994); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9, -29 (West 1994); N.M. Sup. Ct. R. 11-514 (1994); N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04-.12 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2506 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5942 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-
100 (Law. Co-op. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1995).
42 See, e.g., Norandal U.S.A. Inc. v. Local Union No. 7468, 13 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2167, 2168 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986); Coney v. Graham, 699 P.2d 899, 902
(Alaska 1985); Matra v. Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971, 973-74 (Ariz. 1992); Saxton v.
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The privilege, however, is often modified or held inapplicable in libel
cases. Some statutes explicitly exclude defamation cases.43 Even if the stat-
ute itself is silent, court decisions may limit its applicability. In construing
its state shield law in 1990, for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
ruled that when a libel plaintiff is required to show actual malice to prevail,
a media defendant may not invoke the shield law to prevent that plaintiff
from inquiring about confidential sources on whom the defendant relied."
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
that under California law, when a public figure sues a media defendant for
Arkansas Gazette Co., 569 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Ark. 1978); New York Times Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 815 n.8 (Cal. 1990); Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383,
392-94 (Colo. 1994); Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1007 n.4
(Conn. 1984); Delaware v. Hall, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1414, 1414-15 (Del. Mun.
Ct. Mar. 8, 1989); Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1986); Nobles
v. State, 411 S.E.2d 294, 293-99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); In re Contempt of Wright, 700
P.2d 40, 43-45 (Idaho 1985); People v. Palacio, 607 N.E.2d 1375 (I11. Ct. App. 1993);
In re Stearns, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1837, 1839-41 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1986);
Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585, 587-88 (Iowa 1987); State v. Sandstrom,
581 P.2d 812, 814-15 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); Chesapeake Pub-
lishing Corp. v. Williams, 661 A.2d 1169 (Md. 1995); Sinnott v. Boston Retirement
Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Mass.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 980 (1988); Koniak v. Heri-
tage Newspapers, Inc. 476 N.W.2d 447, 449-50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); CBS Inc. v.
Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30, 31-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Sible v. Lee Enters., Inc., 729
P.2d 1271, 1274 (Mont. 1986); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. District Court, 761 P.2d 849,
853-54 (Nev. 1988); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502-03 (N.H. 1982); Dairy Stores, Inc.
v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr.,
Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 277-81 (N.Y. 1988); Clark v. Brown, 393 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990); Taylor v. Miskovsky, 640 P.2d 959, 961-62 (Okla. 1981); Hass v. Port of
Portland, 829 P.2d 1008, 1011-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 590
A.2d 802, 811 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp.,
538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 255-56 (Vt. 1974);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974);
Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 786 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Wash. 1990); State v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d
188, 193-94 (W.Va. 1989); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Wis. 1978). But
see NBC v. Lake City Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990). For a
fuller discussion of court-recognized testimonial privileges, see THE REPORTERS COM-
MIITEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES & INFORMATION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR REPORTERS IN THE 50 STATES AND D.C. (1993).
43 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 paras. 5/8-901 to -903 (Smith-Hurd 1995); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1459 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025
(West 1995).
" Capuano v. Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469, 476-77 (R.I. 1990). But see Sprague v.
Walter, 543 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Pa. 1988) (ruling that a trial court may not draw an ad-
verse inference from a media defendant's invocation of the shield law). In Sprague,
however, Pennsylvania's supreme court further directed the trial judge to instruct the
jury that citing the reporter's privilege does not establish the reliability of the source,
nor the accuracy of the information received. Id. at 1086.
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libel, the balance of interests weighs in favor of disclosure of confidential
sources.4" "[P]roving actual malice may be difficult without knowing the
identity of the informant. Proof of malice may be supported by establishing
that the informant is unreliable, or that no informant even exists. Without
knowing the identity of the informant, such proof is difficult to establish.
'4 6
The practical effect of such rulings can be devastating. If a journalist
refuses to reveal a confidential source, the court may hold her in contempt
and order her to jail, although this sanction is seldom invoked by the courts
in libel cases because it is perceived to be ineffective in compelling disclo-
sure.47 Another harsh alternative is the threat of entry of a default judgment
against the news organization, but this option has been criticized on due
process grounds.48
A court may also adopt a presumption that there was no source for the
information.49 The most frequently chosen sanction by far, however, is the
exclusion of evidence concerning the source or information provided by the
source. Although this sanction generally limits the reporter's testimony to a
simple statement that information was gathered from a confidential source,
the jury may still evaluate for itself the veracity of that testimony, and con-
clude either that a confidential source existed, or that there was no such
source.
50
A classic example of the long, intrusive, and costly discovery process in
libel suits against the media occurred during the course of Philip Morris's
$10 billion libel suit against ABC for the network's Day One broadcasts
accusing the tobacco industry of "spiking" cigarettes with extraneous nico-
tine.5 ' ABC relied on a number of confidential sources to provide informa-
4S Star Editorial, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1993).
46 Id. at 861.
"' See Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980). The court
said that sending a journalist to jail would not help the plaintiff prove his case. "Al-
though we do not say that the contempt power should not be exercised, we do say that
something more is required to protect the rights of a libel plaintiff." Id. at 686.
"' See Georgia Communications Co. v. Horne, 294 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982); Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 623 P.2d 103, 107-08
(Idaho 1980).
" See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Haw. 1981); Downing, 415
A.2d at 685.
o Among the many cases utilizing this option are Desai v. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408
(7th Cir. 1992); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438 (D. Nev. 1987); Liberty Lobby,
Inc. v. Rees, 111 F.R.D. 19 (D.D.C. 1986); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1983); Jamerson v.
Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1984); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 761 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1988); Oak Beach Inn Corp. v. Babylon
Beacon, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1984); Sands v. News Am. Publishing Inc., 560
N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 1990); Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. Div.
1979).
All of the opinions in Philip Morris Co. v. ABC/Capital Cities, Inc. are consoli-
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tion during its investigation: a former R.J. Reynolds executive dubbed
"Deep Cough," a former Philip Morris employee, and an undisclosed num-
ber of federal government employees.52 Invoking the reporter's privilege
against disclosure of confidential sources, ABC refused to identify these
sources or to supply any information that might reveal their identities.53
Philip Morris filed a motion to compel disclosure of the confidential
sources, arguing that the reporter's privilege did not apply in public figure
defamation actions where the reporter is a party.54 In the alternative, Philip
Morris argued that any privilege that existed was qualified and must yield
when balanced against a public figure plaintiff's burden of proving "actual
malice."55
At the same time, Philip Morris issued subpoenas duces tecum to Amer-
ican Express, Citibank, Sprint, Bell Atlantic, Cellular One, MCI, NYNEX,
Hertz Corporation, AT&T, U.S. Air, United Airlines, Continental Airlines,
and Adam's Mark Hotels, seeking the travel, credit and telephone records of
ABC News employees.56 In support of its motion to quash the subpoenas
duces tecum, ABC argued that such discovery from disinterested non-parties
is tantamount to asking the reporter directly because reporters must travel
and use the telephone in order to gather news and foster the free flow of
information." Philip Morris replied that the privilege does not protect par-
ties to a confidential relationship from compromise by a neutral third party
with whom they knowingly shared information.5" Philip Morris also main-
tained that the privilege is personal to the reporter and does not apply in
third party situations.59
In January 1995, the trial court ruled that a qualified reporter's privilege
applied to these third party records, observing that "this type of discovery
will deter sources from divulging information and deter reporters from gath-
ering and publishing information."6 Nevertheless, the court held that the
dated at 36 Va. Cir. 1 (Cir. Ct. 1994). See also Steve Weinberg, Hardball Discovery,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 66.
52 Philip Morris, 36 Va. Cir. at 12 (Jan. 26, 1995 opinion and order compelling




5 Id. at 2.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 4.
"B Id. at 4-5 (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593
F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
59 Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 7.
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qualified privilege was outweighed by Philip Morris's need to discover evi-
dence that might prove actual malice.6'
After further briefing and arguments, the court vacated that order in July
1995. The court found that Philip Morris might be able to rely on other
information to meet its burden of proof.62 For its part, ABC had demanded
production of thousands of pages of documents that it believed necessary to
prove the accuracy of the Day One broadcast.63
In August 1995, ABC settled the libel lawsuits brought by Philip Morris
and R.J. Reynolds by issuing a public apology for airing the spiking allega-
tion.' The apology stated in part: "That was a mistake that was not delib-
erate on the part of ABC, but for which we accept responsibility and which
requires correction."'65 At the same time, ABC noted that the parties contin-
66 as
ued to disagree about the focus of the Day One reports. ABC also paid
the tobacco companies' reportedly substantial attorneys' fees and legal
costs.6" Had the case gone to trial, Philip Morris undoubtedly would have
attempted to maintain its focus on ABC's newsgathering practices. One of
the last orders issued in the case would have permitted Philip Morris to
present an expert witness on "journalistic standards."6
61 Id.
62 Id. at 28 (July 11, 1995 order observing that "prudence suggests that Philip Mor-
ris go further to convince the court that its need for discovery of confidential sources is
compelling").
6 After three court orders, Philip Morris produced the documents on dark red paper
in order to prevent photocopying. Judge Theodore J. Markow denied ABC's motion for
sanctions against Philip Morris for producing documents that were difficult to read and
that emitted a nauseating, chemical-like odor. Id. at 24-25 (May 5, 1995 order denying
motion for sanctions).
" See John Schwartz, ABC Issues Apology for Tobacco Report, WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 1995, at Al, A5.
5 Id.
The apology stated:
ABC and Philip Morris continue to disagree about whether the principal focus of
the reports was on the use of nicotine from outside sources. Philip Morris believes
that this was the main thrust of the program. ABC believes that the principal
focus of the report was whether cigarette companies use the reconstituted tobacco
process to control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes in order to keep people
smoking. Philip Morris categorically denies that it does so. ABC thinks the re-
ports speak for themselves on this issue and is prepared to have the issue resolved
elsewhere.
ABC, Philip Morris Settle 'Spiking' Case, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1995, at 30.
67 See Schwartz, supra note 64, at Al.
See Weinberg, supra note 51, at 66.
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3. Creative Claims and Legal Theories
Because corporations usually are found to be public figures, corporate
plaintiffs carry a heavy burden of proof when suing the press for defama-
tion.69 As a result, corporate plaintiffs must become more creative in their
legal strategies to deflect unfavorable press coverage. Instead of basing their
complaints solely on defamation, they have added counts claiming invasion
of privacy, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.70 Cor-
porate plaintiffs also have sued news organizations for tortious interference
with business relations7 and unlawful disclosure of trade secrets.72 These
latter claims traditionally appear in the context of unfair commercial compe-
tition, but increasingly they have become a means for corporate plaintiffs to
attack and discourage unfavorable news reporting.
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has since been adopt-
ed by more than forty states and the District of Columbia.73 The uniform
act broadly defines "trade secrets" to include information that
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.74
Trade secret laws developed from efforts by courts to establish rules for
fair competition among businesses.75 In 1974, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, identified three policy considerations un-
derlying trade secrets law. 6 One purpose of trade secrets law is to maintain
69 Even when not found to be a public figure, a plaintiff must demonstrate some
fault on the defendant's part. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70 See, e.g., Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995); Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
71 See infra part III for discussion of tortious interference with business relations and
the 60 Minutes incident.
' See infra part II.A for a discussion of Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc.
7' For citations to the state versions, see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr, 14 U.L.A. 440
(1990 & Supp. 1995).
74 Id. § 1(4).
71 See generally JAMES H. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING
PROPRIETARY BUSINESS INFORMATION (1989).
76 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974) (holding that
federal patent law does not preempt state laws protecting trade secrets).
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standards of commercial ethics.'7 Trade secrets law, like patent law, is also
intended to encourage invention.7" Moreover, it discourages breaches of
confidentiality, such as between employer and employee, licensor and li-
censee, as well as "other forms of industrial espionage."'79
Some corporations have attempted to stretch trade secrets law beyond
these fundamental purposes to attack routine news reporting. For example,
in July 1991, Procter & Gamble persuaded Cincinnati law enforcement offi-
cials to investigate the source of a news leak to the Wall Street Journal.8"
A month earlier, the Journal had reported that a Procter & Gamble official
had resigned under pressure and that part of the company's food and bever-
age division might be sold."' The article attributed the information to "cur-
rent and former P&G officials.
8 2
Procter & Gamble alleged that the newspaper's sources had acted in
violation of Ohio's trade secrets law. 3 At the request of the Hamilton
County prosecutor's office, a grand jury issued four separate subpoenas
requiring Cincinnati Bell to identify all the phone numbers in the Cincinnati
and eastern Kentucky areas that had dialed the reporter's office, fax, or
home telephone numbers in Pittsburgh between early March and mid-
June." In the end, the phone company obtained records of more than
800,000 phone lines and forty million long-distance calls. 5
The Wall Street Journal did not learn of the phone searches until early
August, when a former Procter & Gamble manager called the newspaper
and said he had been questioned by Cincinnati police, who told him they
had records of his calls to the newspaper.8 6 Dow Jones & Company, pub-
lisher of the Journal, immediately demanded that Cincinnati Bell refrain
77 Id. at 481-82.
78 Id.; see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (noting
that trade secrets law assures that the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if
not quite patentable inventions).
9 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 484; see also Bonito Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Peabody v. City of Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868);
American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120-21 (Ohio 1991) (upholding
an order that enjoined an attorney from revealing confidential information concerning a
previous employer).
o See, e.g., James S. Hirsch, No Charges Are Expected in P&G Affair, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 1991, at A3; James S. Hirsch, Procter & Gamble Calls in the Law to Track
News Leak, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1991, at Al, A4; P&G Calls in the Law to Trace
Leaks, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1991, at 2.
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from providing any more records. Bell lawyers responded that all subpoe-
naed records already had been turned over to police. 7
By claiming violation of trade secrets law, Procter & Gamble had exe-
cuted a successful end-run around the Pennsylvania"8 and Ohio 9 shield
laws, which give reporters an absolute privilege against forced disclosure of
confidential sources, without having to file a lawsuit directly against the
Wall Street Journal.
C. Courts as Ethics Police: Masson and Cohen
Because Herbert v. Lando recognized that the "conduct and state of
mind" of the press are relevant in libel cases,' the emphasis on proving
fault inevitably led to consideration of whether a news organization's con-
duct in preparing and disseminating the story was reasonable or reckless.
Such examination unfortunately provides judges and juries with the opportu-
nity to sit as de facto ethics tribunals, deciding whether a journalist acted in
a "professional" manner. Although Justice Stevens's majority opinion in
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton9" reiterated the Court's
position that Sullivan requires a public figure plaintiff to prove more than
simply an extreme departure from professional standards to demonstrate
actual malice, convincing the jury that such deviations occurred and amount-
ed to reckless disregard for the truth has become an increasingly important
component of a plaintiff's case.
Connaughton itself provides a detailed blueprint for subjecting the
newsgathering process to analysis, first by a jury, then by an appellate court
engaged in the independent review required by Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc.92 The Connaughton opinion painstakingly ex-
plores editorial decisions such as witnesses contacted, individuals not inter-
viewed, tape recordings deliberately not listened to, competitive consider-
ations that may have motivated a decision to publish with undue haste, as
well as the credibility of newspaper employees' statements about their sub-
jective belief in the truth of what was published. Ultimately, the Court ruled
that the Connaughton jury reasonably could have concluded that the evi-
dence demonstrated not only an extreme departure from professional stan-
dards, but the purposeful avoidance of the truth, or actual malice.93
87 id.
88 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1995).
s OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04-.12 (Anderson 1995).
0 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).
91 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
2 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
9 Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 692-93.
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Many different types of journalistic conduct could be scrutinized under
the rubric of "actual malice." As a result, media defense lawyers now find
themselves defending not only against inquiries about reliance on dubious
sources, lack of corroboration for potentially defamatory information, or
failure to review readily available documentation. They also must be pre-
pared to justify the timing of a story that coincides with a ratings "sweeps"
period, the use of colorful or sensational headlines or teasers, selective re-
tention of notes and drafts, or questionable newsgathering techniques, such
as the use of hidden microphones or cameras. None of these practices, taken
alone, would constitute actual malice as a matter of law. Nevertheless, in the
hands of competent plaintiff's counsel, a pointed recital of many routine
newsroom practices can sufficiently inflame a jury or judge to support a
hefty damages award or even a prior restraint.
Determining what constitutes accepted "professional standards" for jour-
nalists is problematic, to say the least. Reporters in the United States are not
licensed, and do not subscribe to a universal code of ethics or professional
conduct.94 Codes of ethics that do exist, such as those promulgated by the
Society of Professional Journalists, American Society of Newspaper Editors,
or Radio-Television News Directors Association, are aspirational rather than
mandatory in nature. Consequently, a cottage industry of self-described
journalism "experts," many of whom are retired editors or senior academi-
cians, fills the gap between these non-binding codes and the necessity for
articulating precisely what "professional standards" may be.
The lack of consensus on professional standards disquiets many journal-
ists, who are appalled by what they see as lack of any meaningful remedy
for media "excesses."95 One anomalous result was that many in the news
media actually welcomed the Supreme Court's decision to review two ethics
cases in its 1990 term: Masson v. New Yorker Magazine96 and Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.97
In Masson, author Janet Malcolm was accused of having fabricated
quotations that she attributed to psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson in a series of
9 As the West Virginia Supreme Court observed:
[T]here is no objective, reasonable person standard that holds everyone alike to a
uniform level of due diligence of reasonable care .... Unlike the media, the
courts have strict and enforceable canons of ethics, and a litigant aggrieved by the
abusive conduct of a judge is provided a forum where serious sanctions may be
imposed upon the judge. This system may not be perfect, but it is better than
anything the media have.
Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W.Va. 1992).
9' See, e.g., Clark Mollenhoff, 25 Years of Times v. Sullivan, QUILL, Mar. 1989, at
27-31.
9 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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articles that appeared in the New Yorker.98 Masson claimed that the unflat-
tering comments defamed him.99 Malcolm had kept audiotapes of only
some of their conversations, and Masson disputed the accuracy of her tran-
scribed notes of the interviews." ° Accordingly, the Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether tinkering with quotations, if proven, could consti-
tute actual malice. 101
The Court's decision in favor of Masson stopped short of imposing a
requirement of verbatim accuracy on journalists. In an opinion by Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court expressly held that even a deliberate alter-
ation of words will not constitute actual malice as long as the meaning of
the statement is not materially changed.0 2 Nevertheless, the ruling signaled
a willingness on the part of the Court to dictate, however benignly, accept-
able journalistic standards. 3
Similarly, in Cohen, the Court chose to review the propriety of a news
organization publishing the name of a source in violation of an express
promise given by its reporter to keep the informant's identity confiden-
tial."° In deciding that a source whose identity is revealed without permis-
sion is not precluded by the First Amendment from filing suit,0 5 the Court
transformed what previously had been regarded as a purely ethical and prac-
tical obligation into a legally enforceable one. Although Cohen was not a
libel case, it clearly has implications beyond its facts. The ruling relied on
the premise that news organizations enjoy no special immunity from laws of
general applicability, including the laws of contract and of promissory estop-
pel."° Such reasoning could place reporters in the untenable position of
being compelled to reveal a source during the course of a lawsuit, and then
to be sued for breach of contract by the disgruntled source.
98 Masson, 501 U.S. at 501.
99 Id.
'oo Id. at 501-02.
101 Although Malcolm has never conceded inventing the quotations, many journalists
immediately denounced her alleged conduct as unethical and promptly distanced them-
selves from her case. One ad hoc group calling itself "Journalists and Academics Con-
cerned About Media Integrity" even filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme
Court in favor of Jeffrey Masson. For a fuller discussion of the conflict in the industry
over Masson, see Mike Hoyt, Malcolm, Masson, and You, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv.,
Mar./Apr. 1991, at 38-44.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Debra Gersh, Quote Alterations and Libel, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June
29, 1991, at 9 (quoting media attorney Bruce Sanford as stating that "'[The decision]
shows a great sensitivity to the daily newsroom problems of any journalist' . . .. [Ken-
nedy] shows a 'depth of knowledge and appreciation for [the] journalists' profession."').
" Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).




Accordingly, by the 1988-90 terms, the Supreme Court had formally
begun to do what the author of Sullivan had never contemplated: granting
libel plaintiffs' lawyers virtually unlimited license to probe for evidence of
actual malice. This would, in turn, allow judges to determine as a matter of
law what proper journalistic conduct should be. What began as an attempt to
give news organizations breathing space to support the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust and wide-open,"' 7 had turned into a license for the govern-
ment to scrutinize and to regulate newsroom practices.
II. RECENT CASES
Plaintiffs and some courts have moved a giant step beyond Herbert v.
Lando by attempting to make newsgathering practices the primary issue in
litigation against media defendants. In recent cases such as Federal Beef
Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc. and McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble
Co.,"° the issue of truth was secondary, or not even contested by the
plaintiffs. Yet the corporate plaintiffs justified the issuance of restraining
orders as punishment for "improper" newsgathering practices, a remedy that
would have been unobtainable as part of a conventional libel suit.
A. Calculated Misdeeds: Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc.
1. Facts
In December 1993, a Federal Beef Processors employee"° wore a hid-
den camera during his shift at the company's slaughter and distribution
facility in Rapid City, South Dakota."' The employee filmed between five
and six hours of processing operations in the boning room, where the car-
casses of cattle are divided into various cuts and portions."' He provided
the film free of charge to a reporter for the CBS News program 48
107 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
lo 116 S. Ct. 6 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1995).
"0 Federal Beef claimed that the employee was Leendelle McClean and named him
as a co-defendant with CBS. A federal district court later would hold that McClean, a
South Dakota resident, was fraudulently joined to the action in an attempt to prevent
CBS from removing the case from state court under diversity jurisdiction. See Federal
Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 851 F. Supp. 1430 (D.S.D. 1994). Another employee,
Ray Lum, was found to have been the one that wore the hidden camera. Id. at 1435.
1 CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S' Ct. 912, 913 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
"I Id.
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Hours."2 The reporter subsequently contacted officials at Federal Beef and
confronted them with the videotape.
11 3
Federal Beef responded by filing suit against CBS and Leendelle
McClean, the suspected employee,14 in Pennington County Circuit Court
in Rapid City." 5 Federal Beef's complaint listed, inter alia, claims of tres-
pass, invasion of privacy, breach of duty of loyalty, and violation of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act."6 It also asked for an injunction to stop CBS
from broadcasting the videotape." 7
Even in cases where there are no First Amendment interests at stake, a
court generally will not issue a preliminary injunction unless the petitioner
has shown that it has no adequate remedy at law and will be -irreparably
injured if an injunction is denied; the threatened injury is immediate, certain,
and substantial; the petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits; and the
injunction will not have an injurious effect on the general public."8 After
this showing has been made, the decision whether to grant a preliminary
injunction "is within the sound discretion of the trial court."".9 When a
preliminary injunction takes the form of a prior restraint upon the press,
however, the Supreme Court has held that the petitioner also must overcome
a heavy presumption against such injunctions. 2
2. Trial Court's Findings and Order
In Federal Beef Processors, however, Pennington County, South Dakota
Judge Jeff W. Davis ruled that the heavy presumption against prior restraints
did not apply. Judge Davis granted a temporary injunction against CBS
preventing the network from disseminating, disclosing, broadcasting, or
otherwise revealing the videotapes. 2' The accuracy of the news report that
48 Hours had planned to air was never an issue in Federal Beef Processors.
Instead, Judge Davis first focused on the negative economic effects that bad
112 Id.
113 Id.
,1 See supra note 109.
"' The case was subsequently removed to federal court. See Federal Beef Processors,
Inc. v. CBS Inc., 858 F. Supp. 125 (D.S.D. 1994).
,16 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 913.
117 Id.
18 Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc., v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1983).
"1 Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940).
12 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (discussed supra part I.A).
121 Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc., Civ. No. 94-590, slip op. at 8 (S.D.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1994) (order granting temporary injunction), motion for stay denied sub
nom. CBS Inc. v. Davis, No. 18637 (S.D. Feb. 8, 1994), stay granted, 114 S. Ct. 912
(Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
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publicity would have on his home state: "public dissemination of informa-
tion suggesting unsanitary practices or conditions at Federal could result in a
significant portion of the national chains refusing to purchase beef processed
at Federal and thereafter in the Federal plant's closure, for which there is no
adequate remedy at law."' 22 The court, however, made no findings or con-
clusions as to whether unsanitary practices or conditions actually existed at
the Federal Beef plant. CBS later submitted evidence that Federal Beef had
received 600 U.S.D.A. citations in 1993 alone.123
The court found that CBS had employed unethical newsgathering tech-
niques that, if not illegal, were "at the very least ... calculated mis-
deeds."'' These "misdeeds" occurred when CBS "successfully induced" a
Federal Beef employee to wear a hidden camera and recording devices to
work."2 The misdeeds were "calculated" because CBS "knew that wearing
recording devices within Federal's plant was forbidden and, accordingly,
McClean and CBS implemented measures to ensure that the recording de-
vices were concealed."'" These findings led Judge Davis to formulate the
following rationale to support issuing an injunction:
The appropriate focal point of the present dispute is the
manner by which the videotape was secured by CBS. The
Court concludes that but for the calculated misdeeds of CBS,
CBS would not be in possession of the videotape which is
the subject of this action and as a result, conventional prior
restraint analysis is inapposite. 27
Implicit in the court's conclusion is the premise that news organizations
which engage in newsgathering practices deemed to be unethical are not
entitled to First Amendment protection."2 In fact, the court observed that
"there exists significant legal authority which 'holds that there is no First
Amendment interest protecting the news media from calculated mis-
deeds."'29 The court, however, did not cite any legal authority for that
proposition.
" Id. at 3. The opinion also noted that the Federal Beef plant in question employed
320 people, 120 independent truckers, and supported many local ranchers. Id. at 2.
123 Brief for Petitioner at 22, CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit
Justice 1994) (No. A-669); see also Eric Torbenson & Dan Daly, USDA Filed 603 Re-
ports on Federal Beef in '93, RAPID CITY J., Feb. 10, 1994, at 1.
12 Federal Beef Processors, Civ. No. 94-590, slip op. at 4.
'1 Id. at 3-4.
'26 Id. at 4.
'27 Id. at 7.
" See discussion of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine and Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., supra part I.C.
29 Federal Beef Processors, Civ. No. 94-590, slip op. at 7.
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3. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
On February 8, 1994, the South Dakota Supreme Court denied CBS's
application for a stay, instead setting a hearing date in late March, well after
the scheduled broadcast date for that segment of 48 Hours.' Following
the South Dakota Supreme Court's action, CBS immediately appealed to
Justice Blackmun in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit.
Justice Blackmun issued an emergency stay within twenty-four hours."'
In its brief, Federal Beef argued that CBS's newsgathering techniques
constituted not merely "calculated misdeeds," but criminal activity.'32 Fed-
eral Beef contented that when CBS "induced" a Federal Beef employee to
wear a hidden camera, it violated a host of laws.'33
Under South Dakota law it was clear that such activity vio-
lated statutes and case law proscribing invasion of privacy,
protection of trade secrets, inducing the disloyalty and breach
of trust of an employee, and in fact probably amounted to
burglary in that it is the intentional entry into the premises
for an illegal purpose."3
Federal Beef framed the issue of the case as "whether the news media
may utilize a tape obtained by unlawful means and thereafter claim a prior
restraint to enjoy the fruits of its illegality."'35 Justice Blackmun, however,
viewed the issue as whether extraordinary circumstances existed to justify
the "most extraordinary remedy" of a prior restraint.'36 It was not enough
that Federal Beef might suffer economic harm from bad publicity. 37 Jus-
tice Blackmun noted that "[e]ven if economic harm were sufficient in itself
to justify a prior restraint ... [the Court] previously ha[s] refused to rely on
such speculative predictions as based on 'factors unknown and unknow-
able. Y)3
3 CBS Inc. v. Davis, No. 18637 (S.D. Feb. 8, 1994) (order denying motion for
stay), stay granted, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
131 CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994) (order grant-
ing motion for stay).
132 Brief for Respondent at 1-2, CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Cir-
cuit Justice 1994) (No. A-669).
133 Id. at 2.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 914-15 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
137 Id. at 915.
13s Id. (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (Blackmun, Cir-
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Justice Blackmun also rejected the trial court's conclusion that conven-
tional First Amendment prior restraint doctrine was inapplicable because of
CBS's "calculated misdeeds" in obtaining the videotape. 3 9 The remedy for
such misdeeds could be had in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings,
Justice Blackmun noted. 4' In response to Federal Beef's assertions that
CBS's newsgathering techniques were not just misdeeds, but illegal, Justice
Blackmun observed that there was no clear evidence of criminal activity by
CBS."" He added: "If CBS has breached its state law obligations, the First
Amendment requires that Federal remedy its harms through a damages pro-
ceeding rather than through suppression of protected speech.'
4 2
The same day that Justice Blackmun issued his emergency stay, 48
Hours broadcast the footage taken inside the Federal Beef plant. 43 Judge
Davis's preliminary injunction was vacated by a federal district court on
May 3, 1994.'"
B. "Protecting Vanity" Through Prior Restraints: McGraw-Hill Cos. v.
Procter & Gamble Co.
1. Facts
In early September 1995, a reporter at Business Week, the nation's larg-
est circulation business magazine, obtained documents that had been sealed
under a protective order in litigation between Procter & Gamble Company
and Bankers Trust Company. 45 The sealed documents had been submitted
in support of a motion by Procter & Gamble to amend its complaint against
Bankers Trust by adding a RICO claim.
A Business Week reporter called a partner at the firm representing Bank-
ers Trust and asked for a copy of the documents. 46 The magazine claimed
that the reporter did not know the court had issued a protective order allow-
ing the litigants to seal discovery documents that would reveal "trade secrets
cuit Justice 1975)).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 915-16.
141 Id. at 916.
142 Id.
143 Dan Daly, "48 Hours" Airs Federal Tape, RAPID CITY J., Feb. 10, 1994, at 1.
'" Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 858 F. Supp. 125 (D.S.D. 1994), va-
cating Civ. No. 94-590 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1994).
145 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 186-88 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996). The order was entered by the late
U.S. District Judge Carl B. Rubin, who was then presiding over the case. Following the
death of Judge Rubin, Judge John Feikens was designated to hear the case. Id.
'" Keith H. Hammonds, Business Week vs. The Judge, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at
114.
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or other confidential research, development or commercial information," or
information otherwise entitled to protection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.147
Even though McGraw-Hill, the publisher of Business Week, was not a party
to the stipulated protective order, Judge John Feikens would later find that
the reporter's request for the documents was "unlawful.'
141
After the reporter obtained the documents, she called representatives
from both parties to question them about the potential addition of a RICO
claim against Bankers Trust and the information in the supporting docu-
ments."' Upon learning that Business Week was about to publish an article
on the litigation, the parties notified Judge Feikens that sealed documents
had been leaked to the press and requested a restraining order. 5 ' Without
first contacting Business Week or lawyers for its publisher, McGraw-Hill,
Judge Feikens issued a restraining order prohibiting Business Week from
"any disclosure of documents filed under seal.'' Lawyers for the parties
faxed a copy of the order to counsel for McGraw-Hill that evening.' Af-
ter attempting to reach Judge Feikens and being rebuffed by a judge for the
Sixth Circuit, Business Week decided to pull the story to avoid being held in
contempt of court.
53
The next day McGraw-Hill sought expedited review from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining constant contact with the
clerk's office.' On September 19, a panel of the Sixth Circuit issued a
two-page opinion declining to review the order, characterizing it as a tempo-
rary restraining order over which it had no jurisdiction. 155 The same day,
'41 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1996).
The order allowed the litigants to designate discovery material as "confidential" without
further order of the court, unless there was a dispute as to whether it fell within the
order. Id. In that event, the material would be sealed until the court had the opportunity
to resolve the dispute. Id. The order also provided that the parties could modify the
terms of the protective order, upon mutual consent, without prior approval from the
court. Id.
'" Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 193.
149 Id. at 189.
'so Hammonds, supra note 146, at 118.
' Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13,
1995) (order prohibiting disclosure of documents under seal).
" Hammonds, supra note 146, at 118.
153 Counsel for McGraw-Hill called Judge Danny J. Boggs of the Sixth Circuit at
home at 9 p.m. seeking emergency action. Judge Boggs declined to act, suggesting that
more conventional procedural methods would be appropriate. Brief of Petitioners at 1-2,
McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Bankers Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1995)
(No. A-276).
"u See Letter from Richard M. Goehler, Counsel for the McGraw-Hill Cos. to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sept. 15, 1995) (on file with au-
thor).
' Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 95-3996, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir.
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McGraw-Hill sought a stay from Justice John Paul Stevens in his capacity
as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit.
2. Justice Stevens's Opinion
In an opinion issued on September 21, 1995, Justice Stevens acknowl-
edged that the district court's order was entered without notice to McGraw-
Hill and was not supported by the findings of fact required under Rule 65(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 6 Nevertheless, he denied the ap-
plication for a stay, finding that McGraw-Hill should have filed a motion for
a hearing with the district court instead of applying to the Sixth Circuit."7
If McGraw-Hill had done so, the prior restraint would have been lifted by
the district court, or, if not, would have become a final order that would
have been directly appealable to the Sixth Circuit, which could overturn
it. 15
8
Justice Stevens noted that there were unresolved issues of fact, such as
the manner in which Business Week obtained the documents.159 Signifi-
cantly, Justice Stevens remarked that the newsgathering techniques em-
ployed by Business Week were an issue of fact that could affect the decision
of the district court, stating that "the manner in which [Business Week] came
into possession of the information it seeks to publish may have a bearing on
its right to do so."'60
This remark appears to be directly at odds with CBS Inc. v. Davis,16'
where Justice Blackmun observed that "[s]ubsequent civil or criminal pro-
ceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction
for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First Amendment con-
text.' 62 Justice Stevens, however, did not attempt to distinguish it from
Justice Blackmun's dictum, nor to support it by citation to other case law.
In fact, Justice Stevens's opinion contained no citations to authority whatso-
ever. The obvious animus in Justice Stevens's opinion seems to spring from
his displeasure with the procedural tactics adopted by McGraw-Hill's law-
yers. Justice Stevens even took space in his two-page opinion to point out
that the caption of McGraw-Hill's "hastily prepared document" mistakenly
Sept. 19, 1995).






161 CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
'6 id. at 914.
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read: "On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit., 1
63
3. Judge Feikens's Opinions
Justice Stevens remanded the case to the district court.'6 Judge
Feikens apparently viewed Justice Stevens's statement that "the manner in
which [Business Week] came into possession of the information it seeks to
publish may have a bearing on its right to do so' 16 as a mandate to focus
principally on Business Week's reporting techniques. Two days of evidentia-
ry hearings probed Business Week's newsgathering process and the identity
of its confidential sources. The judge permitted lawyers for Procter & Gam-
ble and Bankers Trust to repeatedly press Business Week reporter Linda
Himelstein about the identity of her confidential source.166 Ms. Himelstein
refused to answer, invoking the reporter's privilege under the Ohio Shield
Law 67 and the First Amendment.66 As the judge explained, "[t]he pur-
pose of the[] hearings was to determine whether the protected, confidential
information obtained by Business Week was acquired lawfully and indepen-
dently of the discovery process.)169
On October 3, 1995, Judge Feikens issued two opinions, one finding that
Business Week had unlawfully obtained the sealed documents and making
permanent his restraining order prohibiting the magazine from publishing
those copies of them, 7' and the other granting Procter & Gamble's motion
to amend its complaint and releasing the documents into the public record
for the first time. 7' The anomalous result of Judge Feikens's two orders
163 McGraw-Hill, 116 S. Ct. at 6.
'64 Id. at 7.
165 Id.
166 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 189-90 (S.D.
Ohio 1995).
167 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04-.12 (Anderson 1995).
161 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Ironically, the source Himelstein Was trying to protect was
a partner at the firm representing Bankers Trust, the very party requesting that she re-
veal her source and asking the court to hold her in contempt. During the second day of
the hearing, the source, Steven Holley, a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell, admitted
under examination that he had breached the protective order but denied knowing before
Sept. 21 that the papers had been sealed. See Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 190-
91.
169 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 188 (order and opinion permanently denying
McGraw-Hill the right to publish illegally obtained material covered by protective or-
der).
170 Id.
171 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(order and opinion granting plaintiff's motion for leave to amend its complaint).
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was that Business Week could publish its story with materials obtained from
the now-public record, but technically remained barred from using the con-
taminated copies it had "unlawfully" received from its source. 72
Tracking the language used by Justice Stevens, Judge Feikens stated that
"the manner in which Business Week came into possession of the protected
discovery information has an important bearing on its right to publish
it.' 7 Justice Stevens, however, had focused on the parties' disagreement
over the facts, and on his unwillingness to make a ruling without a hearing.
It was in that context that Justice Stevens observed that the parties seem "to
acknowledge that the manner in which [Business Week] came into posses-
sion of the information it seeks to publish may have a bearing on its right to
do so.' 17
4
Judge Feikens concluded that Business Week had, indeed, obtained the
documents unlawfully, noting:
I cannot permit Business Week to snub its nose at court or-
ders. Business Week was aware of the protective order in this
case but nevertheless continued to pursue the sealed informa-
tion. The integrity of a court and the entire judicial system
requires that its orders be acknowledged and obeyed....
Thus, I conclude that Business Week may not use the confi-
dential materials that it obtained unlawfully. 5
Judge Feikens's reliance on the Supreme Court's 1984 ruling in Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart7 1 to justify his finding that Business Week was
bound by a stipulated confidentiality order to which it was not a party was
clearly misplaced because Seattle Times involved a restraint on a media
party to a libel suit. His ruling, however, assumed that Business Week had
acted unlawfully, and ignored Justice Blackmun's admonition in Davis that
'T Business Week finally was able to publish its full story on the Procter & Gam-
ble/Bankers Trust litigation in mid-October. See Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein,
The Bankers Trust Tapes, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 106.
'" Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 188 (order and opinion permanently denying
McGraw-Hill the right to publish illegally obtained material covered by protective or-
der).
" McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6, 7 (Stevens, Circuit
Justice 1995) (emphasis added).
175 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 193 (order and opinion permanently denying
McGraw-Hill the right to publish illegally obtained material covered under protective
order).
176 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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the First Amendment requires that the remedy for harmful publication be
obtained in a subsequent criminal proceeding, rather than through suppres-
sion of protected speech.'"
In the separate opinion granting Procter & Gamble's motion to amend
its complaint by adding RICO claims, Judge Feikens found that there was
no substantial governmental interest in maintaining the seal on the docu-
ments.'78 The documents could now be viewed, along with the amended
complaint, in the clerk's office. Judge Feikens added, "While the defendants
have an interest personal to themselves not to have these materials revealed
publicly, I cannot keep them from public view for such reasons."1"9 Con-
sidering these conclusions, it is ironic, to say the least, that Judge Feikens
continued to restrain Business Week from publishing its copies of the docu-
ments.
McGraw-Hill appealed Judge Feikens's restraining order to the Sixth
Circuit. During arguments in December 1995, the panel expressed concern
that the appeal might be moot in light of Judge Feikens's second order
granting Procter & Gamble's amended complaint and dissolving the protec-
tive order on the documents. 180
4. The Sixth Circuit's Panel Opinion
On March 5, 1996, nearly three full months after the oral argument, a
divided panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed and vacated Judge Feikens's
restraining orders. 8' The majority opinion, authored bi Chief Judge Gil-
bert Merritt, not only categorically rejected the restraining orders as uncon-
stitutional, but also rebuked the trial judges for entering and upholding the
protective order that permitted sealing the documents in the first place.'
First addressing the mootness issue, Judge Merritt held that Judge
Feikens's order unsealing some of the documents did not render Business
Week's appeal moot. 3 He observed that the original protective order still
remained in place, and that parties to the underlying suit could be expected
to want to keep further details about the case secret." Accordingly, he
177 See CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 914 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
178 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 196-97.
179 Id.
180 At oral argument, Judge Boyce Martin Jr. referred to the 60 Minutes incident,
discussed infra part III, and quipped, "It seems like a U.S. District Judge has less au-
thority than the tobacco companies' executives." Judge Says Media Fears Tobacco
Execs. More Than Courts, REUTERS, Dec. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUNA File.
181 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 224.
184 Id. at 223-24.
1094 [Vol. 4:3
VANITY AND VEXATION
wrote, it could be expected that another dispute between McGraw-Hill and
the parties could arise." 5
Moreover, Judge Merritt found that the unusual circumstances surround-
ing the imposition of prior restraints could create a situation in which it
would be difficult for a news organization to obtain prompt appellate re-
view.'8 6 "To say that a prior restraint for three weeks by TRO is moot af-
ter dissolution would mean that a district court may create an unreasonable
three-week exception to the prior restraint rule."'8 7
Turning to the permanent injunction, Judge Merritt criticized the
"strange combination" of orders that continued to prohibit Business Week
from publishing its copies of the documents, even though the file was now
unsealed. 8 "Such orders serve no purpose other than to make a statement
or declaration of wrongdoing while seeking to prevent review under the
mootness doctrine. It is a clever stratagem: Now you see it, now you
don't." 189
On the merits, the majority opinion characterized the issue as "the clas-
sic case of prior restraint. '' 9" Not only had the court failed to consider
First Amendment issues before granting the temporary restraining orders, the
hearings it eventually held before issuing the permanent injunction "bore no
relation to the right of Business Week to disseminate the information in its
possession.'.'. Inquiries into how the magazine obtained the documents
and its actual knowledge of the terms of the protective order "might be
appropriate ... for a contempt proceeding or a criminal prosecution,"'92
but could not provide the basis for a prior restraint. Judge Merritt also sum-
marily rejected Judge Feikens's reliance on Seattle Times as a justification
for gagging Business Week, noting that Seattle Times addressed restrictions
on parties to litigation, not on independent news media. 3
The Sixth Circuit accordingly reversed the permanent injunction as "pa-
tently invalid."' 94 Judge Merritt also disposed of the temporary restraining
orders, relying on the First Circuit's holding in In re Providence Journal
Co. ' Recognizing that the purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status
quo, Judge Merritt quoted the First Circuit's observation that as far as free-
118 Id. at 224.
186 Id. at *3.
187 Id.
188 Id. at *4.
189 Id.
190 Id.




195 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir.), modified on reh'g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
granted and dismissed on other grounds, 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
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dom of the press is concerned, the status quo is to "publish news promptly
that editors decide to publish.' ' 196 For that reason, the granting of ex parte
TROs is particularly inappropriate in cases involving the news media. Due
process, as well as First Amendment considerations, require notice and a
hearing to prevent impingement on free press rights.
Judge Merritt's harsh and unremitting condemnation of the trial court
judge's conduct is softened by only one observation. Hearkening back to
concerns raised in the dissenting opinions in the Pentagon Papers case
about the deleterious effects of judges acting with undue haste, Judge
Merritt noted that "had the District Court not been rushed to judgment by
both parties and had it engaged in the proper constitutional inquiry, the
injunction would never have been issued.' 198
Seemingly almost gratuitously, Judge Merritt's opinion included lengthy
comment on the propriety of the underlying protective order signed by
Judge Rubin. It is inappropriate, Judge Merritt wrote, for trial judges to
abdicate their responsibilities to oversee discovery and determine which
documents should be made public by allowing the parties to "adjudicate
their own case based upon their own self-interest.' 9  According to Judge
Merritt, Judge Rubin's order violated long-established traditions valuing
public access to court proceedings, as well Rule 26's requirement that seal-
ing be permitted only when good cause is shown." "The increasing, rou-
tine use of protective orders in the courts only assures that challenges of this
type will continue to occur," Judge Merritt admonished.2°' "The private
litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest
does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint. It is not even
grounds for keeping the information under seal, as the District Court ulti-
mately and correctly decided."2 2
' Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 226.
197 Id.
199 Id. at 225.
t9 Id. at 227.
2w Id. at 221.
201 Id. at 223-24. Judge Merritt's observations are particularly significant in light of
the ongoing debate surrounding a proposed amendment to Rule 26(c) to permit protec-
tive orders to be issued on stipulation of parties. See, e.g., Arthur Bryant, A Sneak At-
tack on Open Justice, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at A19; Arthur R. Miller, Effective
Rulemaking Damaged by Politics, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 1995, at A21. The period for
public comment on the proposed amendment closed on March 1, 1996, just four days
before Judge Merritt's opinion issued. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States was slated to consider the proposed amend-
ment at its spring 1996 meeting. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE (1995).
202 Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 225.
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C. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
Even if no preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is
sought, corporate plaintiffs have successfully brought claims that force the
press to defend their newsgathering practices, rather than the accuracy of
their news stories.2 3 In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,2'
plaintiff Food Lion did not attempt to prevent ABC from broadcasting a
report on allegedly unsanitary conditions at Food Lion grocery stores. In-
stead, its lawsuit successfully turned the focus of litigation away from the
allegations of its own wrongdoing to the purported wrongdoing of ABC.
Food Lion is a multi-national food corporation that in the early 1990s
was one of the fastest-growing grocery store chains in the country. In the
fall of 1991, employees from Food Lion stores in the southeast United
States reported abuses of food safety standards to the Government Account-
ability Project (GAP), a public interest group in Washington, D.C. that pro-
vides assistance to "whistleblowers. 2 °5 According to Food Lion, GAP sug-
gested to an ABC News producer in December 1991 that Food Lion would
be a good target for investigation.2" The network also received encourage-
ment to pursue the story from the United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, which had been trying unsuccessfully to organize Food
Lion employees for more than a decade.2 7
In 1992, ABC News began an undercover investigation of Food Lion's
operational practices. ABC News employees sought employment with Food
Lion by using false identities, false employment histories, and false reasons
for seeking the jobs."' According to Food Lion, ABC News utilized the
mail and interstate wire facilities to create false identities and backgrounds,
complete with supporting documentation.2' Once hired, they wore tiny
video cameras and audio equipment to surreptitiously record the actions and
statements of other Food Lion employees in areas not open to the pub-
2 See, e.g., Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (reversing a summary judgment dismissal on a trespass claim involving use
of a hidden camera to videotape material about the veterinary practice); Philip Morris
Co. v. ABC, Inc. 36 Va. Cir. 1 (1994) (discussed supra part 1.B). But see Desnick v.
ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding dismissal of illegal wiretapping and
fraud claims).
887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
205 GAP vs Goliath, BRIDGING THE GAP (Gov't Accountability Project, Washington,
D.C.), Fall/Winter 1995, at 7.
206 Id.
Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 814.
2 Id. at 813-16.
Id. at 817.
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lic.21° The ABC News employees then quit their jobs at Food Lion under
false pretenses."'
The ABC News program Prime Time Live reviewed more than fifty
hours of hidden camera footage taken at the Food Lion stores.2" In its No-
vember 6, 1992 broadcast, Prime Time Live aired five to six minutes of the
footage.213 The hidden camera videotape was used to support the allega-
tions of unsanitary food practices made by several former Food Lion em-
ployees and the accompanying commentary by Prime Time Live anchor Di-
ane Sawyer.214 According to Food Lion, its grocery stores suffered a de-
cline in retail sales and the value of its publicly traded securities decreased
following the broadcast."'
In September 1992, Food Lion filed claims against ABC in a federal
district court in North Carolina for intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, negligent supervision, trespass, breach of fiduciary duty, respondeat
superior, civil conspiracy, violations of federal wiretapping laws, unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and RICO violations.21 6 Food Lion's forty-seven-
page complaint did not include any claims for defamation. ABC moved to
dismiss all of Food Lion's claims for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.217 In addition, ABC
sought dismissal of the entire complaint on First Amendment grounds.2 '
In March 1995, the district court dismissed Food Lion's RICO and wire-
tapping claims, finding that ABC had not engaged in a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity and that the use of hidden cameras and microphones could not
be equated with mail and wire fraud.219 The court, however, allowed the
company to press ahead with its claims for trespass, fraud, and civil conspir-
acy. 220
On the trespass claim, the court held that even though the entry was
consensual, under North Carolina law consent can be negated by a subse-
210 Id. at 815-16.





216 Id. at 812-13.
217 Id. at 813.
218 Id. at 817.
219 Id. at 817-20.
' Id. at 820. The court deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss as to claims for
negligent supervision, respondeat superior liability, breach of fiduciary duty, construc-
tive fraud, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Id. at 813.
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quent wrongful act in abuse of the authority to enter.22' The court found
that Food Lion would be entitled to relief on this claim if it successfully
proved that ABC had engaged in wrongful conduct, such as fraud.222
In upholding Food Lion's right to pursue the fraud, trespass, and civil
conspiracy claims, the court rejected ABC's argument that the claims should
be dismissed on First Amendment grounds. Citing the Supreme Court's
holding in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the court noted that the First
Amendment does not protect the press when it violates generally applicable
criminal or civil laws while engaging in newsgathering activities.' The
court, however, refused to allow Food Lion to seek compensation based on
its claims for injury to its reputation, citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.24 The trial judge stated: "Food Lion
may not... under the guise of some other claim, recover publication dam-
ages for injury to its reputation without establishing the defamation require-
ments of actual malice and falsity."'22
III. THE CHILLING EFFECT OF "TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE" ON THE MEDIA:
CBS PULLS 60 MINuTES INTERVIEW
A. Facts
In early November 1995, CBS decided not to broadcast a taped inter-
view between correspondent Mike Wallace and Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, former
vice president in charge of research at the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation that was scheduled to air on 60 Minutes.' Wigand, who
would have appeared in silhouette to hide his identity, alleged in the inter-
view that Brown & Williamson had thwarted plans to develop safer ciga-
rettes and altered documents to delete references to the project.2 7
Network lawyers were concerned that Brown & Williamson would sue
CBS, but not for defamation. The perceived legal threat was tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations, under which CBS theoretically could be
liable for inducing Wigand to violate a 1993 confidentiality agreement be-
221 Id.
222 Id.
22 Id. at 821-22 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)). Cohen is
discussed supra part I.C.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
z Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 824. In July 1995, Food Lion amended its complaint
to include claims for copyright infringement. See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Food Lion, ABC
in Tape Tug of War, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1995, at D1; Elizabeth Jensen, ABC Ag-
gressively Contests Suit Over Newsgathering, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1995, at B6.
Kurtz, supra note 1, at A3.
, Suein L. Hwang, The Executive Who Told Tobacco's Secrets, WALL ST. J., Nov.
28, 1995, at B1.
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tween him and his former employer. 2 Although Brown & Williamson's
willingness to sue the news media was well known, it never had prevailed
in an action against the press based on such a legal theory.229
Amid criticism of CBS's decision, new details emerged in an article in
the Wall Street Journal: CBS had paid the source $12,000 as a consultant
fee for his help on a previous 60 Minutes story, promised to indemnify him
against any libel action resulting from the broadcast of the interview, and
promised not to air the interview without his permission, which he never
granted.' The CBS lawyers believed that these factors would be evidence
that CBS had interfered with the confidentiality agreement between Wigand
and Brown & Williamson. 231
On November 17, part of a transcript of the aborted interview was pub-
lished in the New York Daily News, and Wigand was identified as the 60
Minutes source.232 Brown & Williamson sent a letter to CBS warning that
it would hold CBS legally responsible for any libel contained in the tran-
script.2 3 On November 21, Brown & Williamson filed a complaint against
Wigand in Jefferson Circuit Court in Louisville, Kentucky.2" The com-
plaint included claims for, inter alia, theft, fraud, and breach of contract.
Brown & Williamson persuaded Judge William Knopf 5 to issue a tempo-
rary restraining order prohibiting Wigand from further violating his confi-
dentiality agreement with the company. 3'
In Mississippi, a chancery court judge237  rejected Brown &
Williamson's motion for a protective order to prohibit Wigand from being
deposed in a lawsuit by the State of Mississippi against tobacco companies
to recoup health care expenses paid by the state in treating smoking-related
illnessesY On November 29, despite the Kentucky order, Wigand ap-
peared at a deposition in that lawsuit and testified before lawyers for the
U.S. Justice Department, who were investigating possible antitrust violations
228 Lambert & Jensen, supra note 2, at B8.
229 Id.
Alix M. Freedman et al., Tort TV: CBS Legal Guarantees to '60 Minutes' Source
Muddy Tobacco Story, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at Al.
231 Id.
232 See, e.g., Bill Carter, Dispute Erupts at "60 Minutes" over Canceling of Inter-
view, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at A10; Howard Kurtz, Details of Unaired Tobacco
Story Emerge, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at A3.
233 See Carter, supra note 232; Kurtz, supra note 232.
" Suein L. Hwang, Brown & Williamson Sues Ex-Executive over Information Leaks
to "60 Minutes", WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at A3.
15 Judge Steven Mershon now presides over the case.
236 Hwang, supra note 234, at A3.
Judge William H. Myers of the Jackson County Chancery Court.
238 Suein L. Hwang, Legal Pincers Close on Ex-Tobacco Aide, WALL ST. J., Nov.
29, 1995, at B6.
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by tobacco companies.239 The transcripts from Wigand's Mississippi testi-
mony were sealed by court order.24° In mid-December, Wigand testified in
Washington, D.C. and New York City before federal grand juries that were
investigating possible criminal violations by tobacco executives."'
B. Did 60 Minutes "Tortiously Interfere" with a Valid Contract?
1. Overview of the Tort
Claims for tortious interference with contractual relations usually arise in
the context of unfair commercial competition. Tortious interference, as with
the law of trade secrets, evolved from court decisions that attempted to
maintain standards of commercial ethics. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines the tort as:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) be-
tween another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the contract, is sub-
ject to liability to 'the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to
the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract. 2
Judge Richard Posner has more succinctly defined the tort as when "one
person persuades another to break a contract with a third. ' 243
2. Applicability of the First Amendment
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Supreme Court held that the
same First Amendment protections that apply to defamation also apply to
claims against the media for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2
Consistent with Falwell, courts have held that plaintiffs may not assert
23Barnaby J. Feder, Former Tobacco Official Begins Giving Deposition, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at A20.
2 Id.; see also Barnaby J. Feder, 6 News Groups Seek to Lift Seal on Testimony in
Tobacco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A23.
"' Barnaby J. Feder, Former Tobacco Executive to Begin Telling Secrets to Grand
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A21. Wigand was ordered by Judge Steven
Mershon to meet with Brown & Williamson lawyers in Louisville prior to testifying
before the grand juries. Id.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
13 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir.
1983).
2" Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
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claims for tortious interference in an attempt to make an end-run around
constitutional libel law. 5
In a case in which Brown & Williamson actually sued CBS for tortious
interference, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
Any libel of a corporation can be made to resemble in a
general way this archetypal wrongful-interference case, for
the libel will probably cause some of the corporation's cus-
tomers to cease doing business with it; and whether this
involves an actual breaking of contracts or merely a with-
drawal of prospective business would make no difference
under the modern law of wrongful interference. But this
approach would make every case of defamation of a corpora-
tion actionable as wrongful interference, thereby enabling the
plaintiff to avoid the specific limitations with which the law
of defamation-presumably to some purpose-is hedged
about.Y6
The Ninth Circuit reached similar conclusions in Unelko Corp. v.
Rooney,27 in which Unelko sued Andy Rooney and CBS for defamation,
product disparagement, and tortious interference with business relations. The
claims were based on Rooney's comments on 60 Minutes that Unelko's
product, Rain-X, "didn't work. 2 4' The Ninth Circuit found that Rooney's
comment was an objectively verifiable statement of fact, but dismissed the
claim because Unelko had failed to show that the statement was false in
substance. 49 Because the defamation claim failed, the court held that the
claims for product disparagement and tortious interference also necessarily
failed. "These claims ... are subject to the same [F]irst [A]mendment re-
quirements that govern actions for defamation.""
45 See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
where plaintiff failed to show falsity, a claim for tortious interference with business
relations was properly dismissed along with defamation claim), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
961 (1991); Redco Corp. v. CBS Inc., 758 F.2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1985) (finding that a
statement of opinion that was not actionable as libel is also improper for interference
with contractual relations), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985); Henderson v. Times Mir-
ror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356 (D. Colo. 1987) (same), aft'd, 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989);
see also Evans v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 601 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(applying statute of limitations for libel to claim for tortious interference with contractu-
al relations).
246 Brown & Williamson, 713 F.2d at 273-74.
7 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
2A Id. at 1051.
249 Id.
2o Id. at 1058.
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Thus, if Brown & Williamson had sued CBS on a claim of tortious
interference for the 60 Minutes interview with Wigand, CBS seemingly
could have asserted First Amendment defenses. Perhaps one concern of
CBS's lawyers in its Brown & Williamson affair was that a tortious interfer-
ence claim filed alone-instead of in conjunction with a claim for defama-
tion-would be treated as existing independently, and thus not subject to
First Amendment principles.
Newsgathering, however, is an activity protected under the First Amend-
ment."5 When a reporter uses routine, or even unorthodox, newsgathering
techniques to pursue a story of public interest and concern, those activities
are covered by the First Amendment. A court would be likely to find that
CBS's First Amendment rights outweigh the alleged harm that their actions
produced in inducing Wigand to disclose truthful information relevant to
public health and safety."
3. Liability Under the Tort
Some commentators have argued that CBS could not be liable for tor-
tious interference with Wigand's contract even if the First Amendment were
disregarded. 3 During the course of litigation, however, the network would
have faced close scrutiny of its newsgathering procedures.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists seven factors to be considered in
determining liability:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other party with which the actor's
conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of
the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.254
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
2 In fact, a New York County trial court reached that very conclusion when it dis-
missed a case in which The Jane Whitney Show was sued for tortious interference, but
not for defamation, for interviewing the plaintiff's ex-wife in violation of a confidenti-
ality agreement. Huggins v. Whitney, 24 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1088 (N.Y. Super. Ct.
Aug. 28, 1995).
" See, e.g. Goodale, supra note 4, at 3.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977). These factors were applied in
Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Any evaluation of CBS's conduct in the context of the tort would cer-
tainly include an examination of its newsgathering techniques. According to
the Wall Street Journal, CBS paid the source $12,000 as a consultant fee for
Wigand's help on a previous 60 Minutes story, promised to indemnify him
against any libel action resulting from the segment, and promised not to air
the interview without his permission." CBS lawyers reportedly considered
these facts to be so unfavorable that they advised spiking the interview with
Wigand. 6 If this is true, then a major motivation for the lawyers' advice
may have been the desire to avoid extensive and intrusive discovery of the
program's newsgathering techniques, which would almost certainly have
included a demand for disclosure of the identity of Wigand and other 60
Minutes confidential sources.2"
Other Restatement factors, however, weigh in favor of CBS. News orga-
nizations are unlikely to have the intent or motive necessary to be liable for
tortious interference."5 As a news program, 60 Minutes's investigations
are conducted for the purpose of presenting newsworthy stories of public
interest. If Brown & Williamson had sued CBS, a court could have held, as
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did in Dulgarian v. Stone 9 -a
case which involved a claim for interference with business relations-that
"the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants' conduct arose from
improper motives or involved improper means. '
Dulgarian involved a three-part investigative report by WBZ-TV, broad-
cast in May 1989 entitled "Highway Robbery?". The report focused on a
potential conflict of interest between local automobile repair shops and auto-
mobile insurance companies." One segment showed employees at Rich-
ard Dulgarian's body repair shop conducting drive-in appraisal services for
the Allstate Insurance Company.262 Dulgarian sued the television station
for defamation, interference with business relations, and injurious false-
hood. 3 After examining the facts, the court stated:
" Freedman et al., supra note 230, at Al.
256 Id.
"' Notably, CBS's decision came on the heels of ABC's announcement of its settle-
ment with Philip Morris, where ABC had been subjected to an exhaustive discovery
into its newsgathering techniques, including the identity of its confidential sources. See
discussion of Philip Morris v. ABC/Capital Cities, Inc., supra part I.B.2.
258 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir. 1983); Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 385 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978);
Dulgarian v. Stone, 652 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1995).
2 652 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1995).
260 Id. at 609.





There is no indication that the report was broadcast for any
reason other than the reporting on an issue of public concern.
There is no indication that the conversation with Allstate
personnel was improper or carried on for any purpose other
than journalism.2"
Under the Restatement analysis, the interests of Brown & Williamson in
preventing its former employee from disclosing truthful information and the
private interests of CBS would be balanced against societal interests.
25
CBS could argue that societal interests favored the broadcast of the Wigand
interview because it involved an issue of public concern. As First Amend-
ment attorney James Goodale commented:
Once the court is required to determine whether the publica-
tion of the embargoed facts is in the public interest, the case
is over. This is as it should be. Employers should not be able
to punish the press for publishing the truthful message of a
whistleblower.26
Brown & Williamson would also have difficulty proving that 60 Minutes
was the proximate cause of Wigand's breach of the confidentiality agree-
ment. The fee that Wigand had been paid was for consultation work on an
earlier project.267 Wigand, who by all accounts had become disillusioned
with the tobacco industry, might have breached the confidentiality agree-
ment in any event.
Finally, the Restatement requires consideration of "the relations between
the parties.""2 The tort of tortious interference, as discussed above,
evolved in the context of unfair commercial competition. CBS and Brown &
Williamson are not competitors in the tobacco industry. 9 As Goodale ob-
served, "[c]onsideration of this factor emphasizes the roots of the tort and
Id. at 609.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (c)-(e) (1977).
Goodale, supra note 4, at 3.
2 Freedman et al., supra note 230, at Al.
265 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (g) (1977).
26 CBS's then-parent company, Loews Corporation, owned one of Brown &
Williamson's competitors, Lorillard, Inc. Lorillard purchased six cigarette brands from
Brown & Williamson in November 1995, just as the facts of the 60 Minutes case came
to light. See John Schwartz, CBS Parent Buys 6 Cigarette Brands, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
1995, at A26.
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Although no one would suggest that otherwise illegal conduct by news
organizations is automatically insulated from punishment by simple invoca-
tion of the First Amendment, routine newsgathering techniques always have
been considered to be protected.27' Simply asking a source a question is
not criminal conduct,2 2 the initial opinions in the Business Week case not-
withstanding.273 Yet if such routine reporting techniques can justify impo-
sition of a permanent restraining order, what might be the sanction for more
unorthodox actions, such as compensating sources, misrepresenting one's
identity, or using hidden cameras?
Applying the Restatement test, it appears that CBS would have prevailed
on the merits in a suit claiming tortious interference with a contract. The
claim, however, would have placed the focus of litigation on the
newsgathering practices of 60 Minutes. Even though the accuracy of the
report, including Wigand's allegations, probably would not be the central
issue, the examination into the "conduct and state of mind" of the journalists
involved would be as rigorous as in any libel suit. Apparently CBS was not
comfortable with that prospect.
In addition, CBS could have anticipated a hard-fought and drawn-out
battle over the identity of its confidential sources. At the time of the deci-
sion to spike the interview, Wigand's identity had not been revealed. CBS
lawyers may have considered the relentless pressure to compromise confi-
dential sources placed on news organizations, as well as the success of cor-
porate plaintiffs in ferreting the sources out by other means, in making their
recommendations to their client. 274 The 60 Minutes incident unfortunately
270 Goodale, supra note 4, at 3.
271 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (observing that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
272 But see United States v. McAusland, 979 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 1003 (1993). In McAusland, two marketing executives were convicted of fraud
and conversion or unauthorized conveyance of government property when they asked
for and obtained information about procurements in contravention of federal acquisition
regulations. Id.
273 Judge Merritt's March 5, 1996 opinion for the Sixth Circuit characterized Busi-
ness Week's conduct as "standard journalistic protocol." Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1996).
274 On February 28, 1996, a New York trial court judge refused to force several 60
Minutes and CBS employees, including Mike Wallace and Morley Safer, to give deposi-
tions or to turn over audio and video recordings to Brown & Williamson in connection
with the company's suit against Jeffrey Wigand. Judge Robert Lippman stated that he
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demonstrates that even financially powerful news organizations can be vul-
nerable to self-censorship when the way in which a reporter acquired infor-
mation is called into question.
Only twenty-five years ago, the New York Times successfully fought the
restraining order that prohibited it from publishing the Pentagon Papers.
Before the order issued, its longtime law firm, Lord, Day & Lord, had with-
drawn from representation when the newspaper vowed to continue publica-
tion of leaked classified documents in defiance of a telegram from Attorney
General John Mitchell asking the Times to desist on grounds of national
security. The lawyers believed that the newspaper might face prosecution
under federal espionage statutes.275
Risking post-publication sanctions, however, is not the same as defying
a court order. Notwithstanding its decision to continue to publish the Penta-
gon Papers after receiving Mitchell's telegram, the New York Times obeyed
the temporary restraining order issued June 16, 1971 by federal Judge
Murray I. Gurfein. 276 Nearly a quarter of a century later, when Business
Week chose to obey the gag order issued by Judge Feikens, editor Stephen
Shepard justified his action, distinguishing it from CBS's conduct in the 60
Minutes case and invoking the Times's legacy:
CBS censored itself, wrongly in my view, by not going
ahead with its planned reporting on the tobacco industry. It
was not under any court order, lawsuit or even the threat of
a lawsuit ....
The Business Week case is totally different. We were ordered
by a Federal district judge not to print a story containing
information from documents sealed by his court. We obeyed
the court order (we are not above the law) and immediately
challenged it ....
Our strategy was the same as followed by ... The New
York Times ... in 1971.277
wanted to safeguard "a viable free press," and that enforcing such subpoenas against
non-party journalists would result in "enormous depletions of time and resources as well
as seriously impede their ability to obtain material from confidential sources." CBS
News Wins Judge's Ruling in Tobacco Suit, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1996, at A12 (quot-
ing Judge Robert Lippman). A Brown & Williamson lawyer said the company would
appeal. Id.
275 See SANFORD UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS 121-23 (1989).
276 The Times's source, Daniel Ellsberg, reportedly was enraged that the newspaper
refused to defy the gag order, or, at the very least, to publish "white space" where the
censored articles would have appeared. Id. at 127-28.
' Stephen Shepard, Business Week's Case Isn't Like CBS's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1995, at A20.
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As Sheppard's letter demonstrates, despite authority permitting news
organizations to violate "transparently invalid" injunctions, 78d defying a
court order to stop publication seems to some to be the action of an entity
that deems itself "above the law." Most news organizations in the same
situation would probably grit their teeth and follow Business Week's exam-
ple, confident that a speedy appeal would quickly overturn such a restrain-
ing order. Yet, experience shows that this is not always the case. Despite an
"expedited" appeals schedule, Business Week was still awaiting relief from
the Sixth Circuit nearly three months after its initial argument in December
1995, reinforcing Justice Blackmun's 1975 admonition that, "where... a
direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media,
each passing day may constitute a separate ... infringement of the First
Amendment. 79
A lesson of the Business Week case may be that sometimes a news
organization's duty to its readers or viewers must supplant the
"law"-assuming that the law has been applied erroneously by a trial
judge.' ° In the face of an unconstitutional gag order, a newspaper or
broadcast news operation should be prepared to face contempt, or other
legal liability, in order to carry out its mission."
Advocating this particular form of civil disobedience is not to suggest
that the risks of post-publication sanctions, even if falling short of prosecu-
tion under espionage statutes, are insignificant in comparison to contempt.
Corporate litigants have shown themselves to be extremely creative in their
litigation strategies against those who contemplate publishing information
criticizing industry practices. A news organization understandably might
contemplate dropping a story if it fears that publication would put a confi-
dential source at risk, expose it to imposition of substantial damages awards,
or to years of costly litigation.
Nevertheless, some would argue that the latter risks are, or should be,
simply a cost of doing business. As Lawrence K. Grossman, former presi-
dent of NBC News observed, "[a] decision against CBS for tortious interfer-
ence with a contract could be substantial, but is hardly likely to bankrupt a
company worth $5.4 billion .... [O]wning a company with a news division
278 See In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1st Cir.), modified on reh'g,
820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. granted and dismissed on other grounds, 485 U.S.
693 (1988). Judge Merritt cited this holding with approval in his opinion for the Sixth
Circuit in Procter & Gamble. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d
219, 226 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996).
279 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice
1975).
'o See, e.g., State v. Alston, 887 P.2d 681 (Kan. 1994).
21 See, e.g., id. But see United States v. CNN, 865 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(finding that defiance of even unconstitutional court orders by the news media cannot
be justified or permitted).
1108 [Vol. 4:3
is one of the risks CBS stockholders take."2"2 It is a sad day for the First
Amendment when journalists back off from a truthful story that the public
needs to be told because it fears being sued over the way they got the in-
formation.
Under that standard, is it likely the Pentagon Papers would be published
today?
22 Lawrence K. Grossman, CBS News, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen Interview,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 39, 51.
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